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ABSTRACT

2. BACKGROUND

Many different countries censor the internet within their
state. Citizens frequently wish to avoid the state censorship. There are many different methods that have been developed to achieve this. Governments and citizens are in a
constant arms race, with both developing opposing technologies. China in particular has the largest population of people on the planet, and the Chinese government attempts to
censor the internet. This paper will investigate three methods of navigating around state censorship: Cachebrowser,
INTANG and Tor. Cachebrowser and INTANG were developed specifically to navigate around state censorship while
Tor was originally developed for anonymous browsing. This
paper will analyze their effectiveness and viability to avoid
censorship.

In order to understand how circumvention techniques work
a basic understanding of some internet protocols and concepts is required. In this section, background will first be
given on the basic frameworks of the internet. Also, background is given on the Transport Control Protocol (TCP).
This background information is necessary to understand how
INTANG circumvents the GFW. Information is also given
on Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). A foundation in
this subject is necessary to understand how Cachebrowser
circumvents the GFW. An overview of Tor will also be given
in this section. Background on Tor is necessary to understand one of the most common ways of circumventing internet censorship and to understand how the Chinese government attempts to stop Tor traffic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The largest group of people in the world with censored
access to the internet is the population of China, with upwards of 1.3 billion people. The Chinese government still
actively censors the internet through a system of network
monitoring and network manipulation, referred to broadly
as the Great Firewall of China (GFW) [11].
This paper will describe the methods and evaluate the
success of three separate ways of evading the censorship
of the GFW. These methods are Cachebrowser, INTANG
and Tor. These methods each work in very different ways.
Cachebrowser works by allowing the user to easily access
uncensored versions of websites that are usually blocked by
accessing the cached versions of these sites that the Chinese
government cannot feasibly block for reasons that will be
discussed in section 3.1. INTANG works by manipulating
the internet traffic being sent by the user’s machine directly
to avoid censorship by manipulating packets which will be
discussed in depth in section 3.2. Tor works by bouncing
the user’s connection through multiple different nodes. This
makes it difficult to track. How the Chinese government
probes for Tor servers will be discussed in section 3.3
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2.1 Internet Basics
In order to understand how the Chinese government censors the internet and to understand the TCP protocol, first
some internet frameworks must be explained. To begin with
client and server roles need to be explained. When you make
a request to visit a website such as www.facebook.com your
computer talks to the server for facebook. This is referred
to as the server because the user makes a request and the
server serves the content to the user. The user in this case
is referred to as the client.
Before the client actually makes a request to facebook.com
it needs to know how to get to it. Each server on the internet
has a unique address associated with it. This is called an IP
address [10]. In order for the client to find the IP address for
a server they are trying to access they must make a Domain
Name System (DNS) request. This is done by making a
request to a DNS server which has a list of IP addresses for
different websites in a cache. The client tells the DNS server
the website they are trying to access. The server then sends
the client the IP address of the website they are trying to
access. Finally, the client can make a request to the server
they are trying to access and send data to it and the server
can send data back to the client.
One way the Chinese government attempts to censor the
internet is by manipulating the records on DNS servers to
return incorrect IPs for websites or to drop packets for requests to websites the government does not want clients to
be able to access. This practice is referred to broadly as
DNS poisoning [3].
Another way the Chinese government attempts to censor
the internet is through a technique called IP address filtering
[5]. This is where the IP of the website you are trying to
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Figure 1: Diagram of a TCP packet taken from [9].
access is blocked at the hardware level, usually on your home
router. This is different from DNS poisoning because even
if we know the IP address of the website we are attempting
to access we cannot get to it.
The final censorship technique that will be mentioned in
this paper is keyword censorship [11]. This is where the
Chinese government monitors the client’s internet traffic and
will terminate connections with keywords the government
has deemed sensitive. This is a way to block connections
if the IP of the website is not blocked and its DNS records
have not been poisoned.
Another concept that is necessary to understand circumvention techniques is the idea of a proxy, sometimes referred
to as a proxy server [7]. A proxy is essentially a server that
makes web requests for you. Instead of talking directly to
the server the client wants to access, it talks to a different
server, which talks to the server the client wants to talk
to. Then the proxy server then takes the information the
intended server sent it and sends it back to the client.

2.2 The TCP Protocol
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) [10] is one of the main
internet standards. The main data structure of TCP is the
packet. Data is sent in discrete pieces in order. One of these
pieces is referred to as packet. This order is maintained
by incrementing the sequence number with each new packet
that is sent. Packets are also sent to establish and end a connection. Figure 1 shows a diagram of a TCP packet. The
first 16 bits are reserved for the source port. The next 16 are
reserved for the destination port. Bits 32 to 63 are reserved
for the sequence number. Bits 64 to 95 are reserved for the
acknowledgement number if the packet is flagged as an ACK
(acknowledgement) packet. The data offset bits serve a dual
purpose. They indicate the size of the TCP header and the
offset from the beginning of the header to the beginning of
the actual data. The next three bits are reserved. Next, the
flag bits begin. These indicate the type of packet. Bits 112
to 128 indicate the windows size the sender of the packet is
willing to receive. The next section of bits is a checksum
which is used for error checking. The next section is the urgent data if this is a flagged URG (urgent) packet. There are
multiple flags that can be set. Many of these are not relevant
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to this paper the relevant ones are SYN/ACK/FIN/RST.
The ACK flag indicates that the packet is an acknowledgement packet. The RST flag indicates that the connection
should be reset. The SYN flag indicates that sequence numbers should be synced. In practice this should only be used
at the beginning of the connection process. The FIN (finish)
flag indicates that this is the last packet from the sender.
Another important aspect of the TCP protocol to know
for this paper is Time to live (TTL). Each packet is given
a TTL. The TTL indicates how long the packet will stay in
the network before it destroys itself. This is useful so that
packets do not clog up network infrastructure forever if they
do not reach their intended destination.
There are three main steps to transmitting data using the
TCP protocol. This first step is to establish the connection
using a handshake process. A connection is a link between
client and host where data can be sent freely between client
and server. Next the actual data is sent. Finally the connection is terminated.
Connection establishment is a multistage process. The
first stage is when the user establishes a connection to the
server. Next the user sends a SYN (sync) packet to the
server. Once the server receives this SYN packet it sends an
ACK (Acknowledgement) packet back to the user along with
a SYN packet. The next step to establish data exchange
is for the user to send an ACK packet back to the server.
After this process has been completed regular data transfer
can occur.
Closing a connection is also a multistage process. Closing
a connection is different from establishing a connection in
that a client or a server can close the connection. Only a
client can establish a connection. The process for closing a
connection on the server end or the client end is the same
but the roles are reversed. As an example let’s consider a
server closing a connection with a client. The server will
send a FIN packet to the client with the sequence number of
the next data packet the client is expecting to receive. Once
the client receives the FIN packet from the sever it sends
an ACK packet with the sequence number increased by one.
The client then sends the server its own FIN packet with
sequence number relative to the amount of data it has sent
to server thus far. The server will then send a final ACK
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packet to the client and the connection will be terminated
on both ends.
Another part of the TCP protocol that is manipulated
to get around censorship is the TCP Control Block (TCB).
The TCB is a data structure that is created by the TCP
protocol when a connection is established. This TCB is normally created on the client and the server, but in the case
of the GFW one is also created by the GFW to monitor
the connection. The purpose of the TCB is to keep track of
all connections incoming and outgoing on the machine it is
created on. The GFW uses the TCB it creates in combination with packet inspection to terminate connections with
sensitive keywords.

2.3 CDNs and cached content
CDNs [6] also known as content delivery networks are a
distributed set of servers hosting web content. The goal of
this system is to decrease latency by redirecting users to
servers hosting the content near them instead of one central
one that could possibly be across the globe. CDNs are not
run by the companies that have the actual content. They
are run by a separate company and pay the company that
runs the CDN to host their content. There are many reasons to use a CDN. One reason is less stress on a single
server. Since the network load is spread out between multiple servers hosting the cached content, no one server takes
the brunt of the load. The servers that host this cached
content that users access are referred to as edge servers.
A common way to implement a CDN for an already existing website is through DNS modifications. When navigating
to the web address for a site, the client will be redirected
for the CDN server for all content that does not frequently
change on the site. This would be things like logos, headers that are always the same, etc. Content that changes
frequently will be served by the host server. In some cases
for very popular websites dynamic content is still hosted on
CDN servers. This is accomplished by having a high speed
pipeline from the host server to the CDN server which keeps
the CDN server up to date. When a CDN server has content change on it, it relays this information to all other CDN
servers hosting the site so that things are consistent. As a
result of the fact that CDNs are operated by companies separate from the ones wanting their web content hosted, multiple different websites content is stored on the same CDN
server. The client just requests the portion of the content
that they actually need.

2.4 Tor
Tor [8] gets its name from the project’s previous name
“The Onion Router”. Tor is a free piece of software that is
used for anonymous internet browsing. It achieves this by
redirecting the user’s connection through multiple different
nodes. Tor is referred to as ”The Onion Router” because
each data packet is wrapped in a layer of encryption for
each node that it passes through. Each node only decrypts
one layer of information to know where to send the packet
next and does not have access to the actual data you are
sending. This is because the actual data is only located
in the last layer. Figure 2 illustrates this process of traffic
traveling through multiple nodes. This makes it difficult to
track. Another important feature of Tor to understand is
the Tor bridge. A Tor bridge is essentially the same as a
Tor node. The difference is that the list of Tor bridges is
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Figure 2: Diagram of Tor traffic through nodes.
Taken from [1].
not publicly available, like it is for Tor nodes. One of the
ways the Chinese government blocks Tor traffic is to block
all IPs of the publicly listed Tor nodes.
Tor also has the ability to use multiple different pluggable
transports. A pluggable transport is a type of cipher suite,
a set of encryption algorithms which the data is encrypted
with before being sent out. This allows users to access parts
of the Tor network that are usually blocked by the Chinese
government using IP address filtering. Pluggable transports
also work to disguise traffic from being identifiable as Tor
traffic. This is because even if censors do not know what
website you are trying to access they will terminate your
connection if they recognize it as Tor. Not all pluggable
transports work well for avoiding the censorship of the Great
Firewall however. These pluggable transports often have
only one layer of encryption and encrypt packets in an easily
recognizable way, allowing the government to recognize Tor
traffic and block it accordingly. The currently recommended
pluggable transport to use is meek-amazon. Meek-amazon
works by using a technique called domain fronting. While
too complicated to explain in-depth in this paper, domain
fronting makes it look like the client is accessing a different
website than they actually are. The meek-amazon pluggable
transport accomplishes this by routing traffic through Amazon cloud servers, which then access the Tor network as a
proxy. Figure 3 illustrates how the meek-amazon pluggable
transport works.

3. METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTION
3.1 Cachebrowser
Cachebrowser [11] is a tool developed by John Holowczak
and Amir Houmansadr to bypass the censorship of the Great
Firewall of China. It uses CDNs and cached content, as
mentioned in Section 2.3, to access web pages that would be
inaccessible using the internet without a circumvention tool.
Using cached content is way of circumventing common censorship techniques such as IP address filtering. IP address
filtering is the process of blocking access to certain IP addresses. IP address filtering is ineffective at blocking CDNs
because one website is spread across multiple different IPs,
so the censors would have to blacklist all of them to block
the site. Also, because of the way edge servers work, multi-
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Figure 3: Diagram of meek-amazon domain fronting taken from [4].
ple sites are hosted on one server, so blocking access to one
server will inadvertently block access to all websites on that
shared IP, not all of which the censor necessarily desires to
block.
DNS interference is another widely used censorship technique and is most effective at blocking cached content. DNS
interference works by interfering with the name resolution
process when trying to access a blocked website. This is effective at blocking cached content because it doesn’t matter
how many IPs the content is spread across or if more than
one site is hosted at that one IP. This is because the DNS
interference prevents the end user from knowing the IP of
the content in the first place.
Cachebrowser works by keeping its own database of IP
addresses to CDN hosted alternatives to regular content.
When Cachebrowser encounters a CDN domain it internally
enumerates and saves all other IP addresses for that CDN
in case that one is censored. If Cachebrowser encounters
a customer domain it will return the addresses of CDNs
which host that content. This is done by using the free DNS
resolver www.digwebinterface.com. This site is currently
not blocked in China.
As an alternative to this method, Cachebrowser also implements a remote bootstrapper using SWEET [2]. SWEET
is a communications tool that encapsulates messages through
emails and sends them through standard email protocols.
In the case of Cachebrowser, a web server is set up in the
United States watching for emails. When a Cachebrowser
user makes a request for a site it does not have a CDNhosted IP for a message is sent out through SWEET using
the bootstrapper. This message is sent to a server in the
United States. The server then makes the DNS lookup and
sends the information back to the client to be added to its
database.

3.2 INTANG
INTANG [5] is a tool developed by Wang et al. to avoid the
censorship of the GFW. It combines many different strategies. A large portion of the paper [11] is dedicated to figuring
out out how the GFW works using trial and error to gain
knowledge of the system in order to help develop a tool to
avoid it. ITANG works by implementing all of strategies
evaluated in the analysis section of the paper. There are
too many individual strategies to go over all of them in this
paper, but they fall into 3 main categories: TCB creation,
TCB teardown, and data reassembly.
TCB creation works by sending a SYN insertion packet
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with the incorrect sequence number to create a false TCB
on the GFW and then initiating the real connection with the
server, which the GFW will ignore because of the sequence
number discrepancies.
TCB teardown works by by crafting RST,RST/ACK and
FIN packets with a TTL constructed in a such that the
packet reaches the GFW and terminates the TCB but does
not reach the server, thus keeping the server alive.
Data reassembly has two separate forms: Out-of-order
data overlapping and In-order data overlapping. Out-oforder data overlapping works by sending garbage data fragments with the same offset and length as the real data.
When the GFW encounters two packets with the same offset
and length it records the first one and ignores the second.
In-order data overlapping works by filling up the GFWs input buffer until it is overloaded and can no longer read new
data. This done by crafting insertion packets with either a
wrong checksum or a very short Time to Live (TTL) so they
fill up the GFW buffer while still keeping the connection to
the server alive.
INTANG uses a combination of all these strategies together with new strategies developed from analyzing the
performance of the old strategies to approach circumvention from multiple angles. INTANG is a measurement tool,
which means that it keeps track of which strategies work
with regards to different IPs and adjusts strategies in use
based on that.

3.3 Tor
Unlike [5] and [11] which both developed tools to circumvent the GFW and tested them within their paper, [4] instead examines the GFW behavior and hypothesizes on how
this information can be used create Tor servers that can
more easily avoid blacklisting. Probing for Tor servers is
triggered the the GFW sees traffic that carries the signature
of a cipher suite that Tor uses. Tor in its default configuration is essentially completely useless already since it has
publicly available list of IPs the government can blacklist
outright. Tor developed a pluggable transport layer in response. The suggested pluggable transport to use currently
is meek-amazon or meek-azure. Neither of these transports
were tested in the paper as they were new and not yet popular at the time.
For the study, two different infrastructures were created
and long running Tor servers’ logs were analyzed. One infrastructure that was created was the shadow infrastructure.
This infrastructure was built up of private Tor bridges that
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censored browsing in every case where non-censored browsing is available. The maximum difference between page
download times between Cachebrowser and a non-censored
version inside of China is .725 seconds. Moving on to the
latency sample data from page access in the United States,
Tor has higher latency than Cachebrowser in every case.
This suggests that if Tor were to be tested within China it
would most likely also be slower than Cachebrowser there as
well. The privacy of Cachebrowser is also robust. Assuming
the CDN is using an encrypted pathway, which almost all
do, the state cannot see what content you are viewing. The
state will also not know what website in particular you are
viewing because multiple sites are hosted at the IP since the
CDN serves multiple different sites off of the same server.
The only possible leak in this situation is that the CDN
itself has information about its visitors. However, sharing
this information with anyone is a violation of the CDNs user
agreement therefore we can assume that they do not share
this information.

4.2 INTANG Results
INTANG [11] in general is very successful at avoiding the
censorship of the GFW. Research indicates that success rates
for different strategies vary wildly. INTANG takes advantage of this by implementing multiple different packet manipulation strategies and choosing the best one systematically. Figure 7 shows the success rates of the multiple individual strategies tested and the success rate of INTANG
itself.
One side effect of INTANG is that because the government
poisons DNS requests in the same way it blocks TCP traffic,
INTANG is also effective at evading DNS poisoning. Figure
5 shows the success rate of accessing DNS servers using INTANG. The data was collected querying a DNS poisoned
domain, in this case www.dropbox.com, 100 times. The discrepancy in the DNS resolution table is because the area
of Tianjin is an outlier. Success rates are much lower in
Tianjin. The exact reason for this is unknown, but it is hypothesized that the GFW infrastructure is more developed
in this area. Success rates in Tianjin were 38% for DYN 1
and 24% for DYN 2. DYN 1 and DYN 2 are two different
DNS servers. In particular DYN 1 is Google’s DNS server
8.8.8.8 and DYN 2 is Google’s DNS server 8.8.4.4. Normally
connections to these DNS servers are terminated using a
TCP connection termination. Research also indicates that
two OpenDNS resolvers 208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220
are uncensored even without the use of INTANG. This is
similar to the method that the bootstrapper uses of simply
request the DNS lookup from an uncensored address in the
first place.

4.3 Tor Results
Research [4] found that while the GFW may not be able
to detect Tor traffic from clients using sufficiently advanced
pluggable transports such as obfs2 and obfs3, it can effectively probe for and shut down Tor servers regardless of the
cipher suite used. Research also indicated that the Chinese
government’s Tor probes are active in real-time, only stopping for short periods.

5. CONCLUSIONS
After analyzing three circumvention techniques it is clear
that there are advantages and downsides to each. Tor is
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